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Executive summary 
 This submission is based on evidence derived from three empirical studies of 
police intelligence practice carried out over the last 10 years (see James, 2013, 
2016 and 2017).  
 Those studies suggest that even if the amelioration of some long-standing 
problems in that milieu can be discerned, structural and cultural barriers to 
the effectiveness of the work remain. 
 Too often in mainstream policing, intelligence practice is seen as ancillary to 
the business of ‘real’ policing; co-existing in parallel with the operational 
world but not routinely influencing it in sufficiently meaningful ways.  
 In the last three years, meaningful efforts have been made to professionalise 
the intelligence function but the extent to which those efforts have yet borne 
fruit is debateable. 
 Beyond the higher policing units (whose raison d’être is the conversion of 
intelligence into action against serious and organised crime), there seems to 
be limited understanding of the value of intelligence and a propensity to 
underestimate the merits of the work.  
 Within the institution, advocates of intelligence, and motivated intelligence 
practitioners, have found it difficult to shift the dialectic to one in which 
intelligence is seen as central to the success of the policing mission.  
 These factors undermine the institution’s ability to respond effectively both 
to evolving demands and changing patterns of crime. 
 
Introduction 
i. The author has been researching police intelligence practice in the UK, at doctoral 
and post-doctoral level, for almost 15 years. He advised the police institution in its 
review of the UK’s National Intelligence Model (2012-13) and assisted in the 
redrafting of the relevant UK College of Policing’s guidance to practitioners (2015). 
He has published extensively on the subject and continues to act as adviser, on 
intelligence and related subjects, to the National Police Chiefs Council’s (NPCC) 
Intelligence Innovation Group and to the Chair of the NPCC’s Crime Operations 
Coordination Committee.  
ii. This evidence is derived from the author’s doctoral study into the UK National 
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Intelligence Model (NIM) (2005-12; N=147); a post-doctoral study into investigative 
practice in England and Wales (2012-14; N=213); and a College of Policing-
sponsored study into ‘what works?’ in criminal intelligence in the UK (2013-16; 
N=113).  
 
iii. Much of the detail of those studies necessarily is omitted from this submission but 
the results have been published elsewhere; either as scholarly works or as peer-
reviewed papers and are readily available (see James, 2012, 2013, 2013a, 2016 and 
2017).  
 
Evidence 
1. This submission argues that policing’s organisational and cultural divides sustain a 
covert anti-intellectualism that, allied to practitioners’ seemingly unshakeable faith 
in pragmatic - rather than reflective or consilient – thinking, dominates the policing 
milieu. That produces a bounded rationality that undermines police intelligence 
practice and limits policing’s ability to respond effectively both to evolving demands 
and changing patterns of crime. 
2. Though perhaps counter to common understanding, it was only at the very end of 
the twentieth century that intelligence routinely was used to inform investigative 
strategy in the mainstream (Grieve, 2004). Invariably a significant factor in the 
discovery of evidence, before that time, criminal intelligence was not considered a 
discipline in its own right so that even though an intelligence architecture supporting 
the higher policing function was well established,1 mainstream policing lacked its 
equivalent.  
 
3. Briefly, intelligence work, in a formal sense, was never considered relevant to the 
mainstream, where the response dynamic and community concerns dominated 
popular discourse. Craft knowledge of intelligence practice was passed down from 
generation to generation within specialist units as a form of oral history that was 
                                                     
1 This had grown and developed since 1883 when the Special Irish Branch was established in London to 
challenge the threat from ‘Fenians’.  
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kept from the wider service. In the higher policing environment, craft rules meant 
that ‘need to know’ invariably outweighed ‘dare to share’ (Brodeur, 2010).  
 
4. Together, these have constrained wider organizational understanding of 
intelligence’s worth and limited its influence on decision-makers in the policing 
mainstream where managers and supervisors often lacked a real appreciation both of 
intelligence staff and of the value of intelligence products. 
 
5. Whether policing is craft or science; trade or profession has exercised scholars’ 
minds for many years. Most craft occupations are exclusive; closed shops that protect 
their rites, rituals and secrets from public view. That description fits traditional 
police intelligence practice well.  
 
6. In the modern era, with professionalization very much at the top of the police’s 
own agenda (CoP, 2015), and with the onus on public authorities to publish or at 
least to facilitate public access to the data they collect and generate, there is an 
obvious need to professionalise the police’s information management processes. 
 
7. Arguably, intelligence has little value if it cannot be put to use. It is accepted 
almost universally that there should be clear water between the intelligence officer 
and the policy or decision-maker (see for example Betts, 1978 and Dahl, 2013).  
 
8. Resolving the kinds of conflicts that arise routinely at that nexus point are far 
easier said than done. Decision-makers sometimes disregard their analysts on the 
grounds that they are better placed to judge the situation themselves (Omand, 2010) 
and analysts must always be alert to the possibility of allowing the process to be 
skewed in ways that deliver something that merely validates policy (see Butler, 2004 
and Rollington, 2013). 
 
9. It is naïve to expect that analysts always can resist those kinds of pressures. 
Analyses and decisions may represent two sides of the same coin but analysts rarely 
decide or direct action; power invariably rests with the decision-maker (Herman, 
2001 p.15).  
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10. The introduction of the Human Rights Act, 1998 and the Regulation of 
Investigatory Powers Act, 2000 (RIPA) delivered greater transparency to those 
processes. The Acts obliged the police service to completely overhaul its intelligence 
apparatus to meet the levels of accountability the new legislation demanded. That 
has been universally welcomed. 
 
11. One element in these new arrangements that has proved stubbornly resistant to 
change is the dysfunctionality found at the pivotal intelligence officer/decision-
maker nexus point. Intelligence assessments just do not have sufficiently meaningful 
impacts on decision-makers in mainstream policing (see James, 2013 and 2016).  
 
12. Competing organizational sub-cultures may be but one of the issues at the heart 
of this dynamic but it is a significant one. There is a power imbalance in policing that 
has created and that maintains a gulf between the intelligence and operational 
worlds (see James, 2016). That is defined by perceptions of their relative worth to the 
wider organization (see Innes et al, 2005, James, 2012 and 2013).  
 
13.Though the police have employed intelligence analysts for more than 20 years, the 
role continues to be perceived as low status and ancillary to the policing mission (see 
for example Cope, 2004 and the author’s own work in this area). There is a constant 
churn of staff so that experienced analysts constantly leave the organization to be 
replaced by trainees. Inevitably, novices’ views carry less weight and they can more 
easily be discounted by decision-makers.  
 
14. Scholars from a range of academic fields recognise that heuristics, experiential 
learning, and schemas can explain the realities of decision-making in complex 
situations. Tost et al (2011) highlighted that individuals’ receptivity to advice is 
influenced by three factors: the character of the task to which the advice refers; the 
character of the advisor; and the psychological or emotional state of the decision 
maker. They argue that ‘the more powerful, can ‘be less open to using advice from 
others… [and] can lead individuals to discount advice even from individuals who 
have high levels of expertise’ (2011 p.53-4).  
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15. This is not just a matter of culture or of organizational dynamics; it is also a 
matter of decision-making style. The two are inextricably linked. As many 
researchers have observed, it is cultural conditioning that encourages police 
decision-makers to see the world in binary terms (for example see Wong, 2015).  
 
16. In fluid, dynamic, often dangerous situations those qualities can be the difference 
between success and failure. They are, and should be, prized but those kinds of 
situations do not represent the norm in public policing. Indeed, they represent only a 
tiny fraction of police business (see for example Reiner, 2010). When time allows, 
deliberation - in controlled environments, shown to benefit experts and the less 
skilled alike (Moseley et al, 2012) - should always be part of the decision-making 
process. 
 
17. That reflection and consilience routinely are not factors in policing is a product of 
the pragmatism that dominates police decision-making. Decisions are based on 
tradition (what has always worked), experience, and in many cases (as Wong, 2015 
has argued) blind faith. Common sense suggests that experienced people make the 
best decisions; that seems logical but there is a growing body of research that 
suggests that experience is a factor only in tasks that cannot easily be broken down 
into their component parts (see for example Dane et al, 2012).  
 
18. Durkheim (one of the founding fathers of sociology), challenged that truism as 
deterministic. For him, judgement and experience were little more than personal 
constructs of charismatic leaders. He attacked pragmatism as anti-intellectual, 
observing that it relied heavily on personal experiences and subjective judgements 
that were not necessarily generalizable (Durkheim and Allcock, 1983). 
 
19. The action-oriented culture, that dominates the policing milieu, prizes 
pragmatism as the vehicle by which red tape and other bureaucratic blockers are 
confronted and negotiated to resolve problems quickly with the minimum of fuss. 
Policing celebrates that behaviour because it is consistent with the dominant 
organisational ‘can-do’ culture (see James, 2013), but the reality is that even ‘can do’ 
organisations may sometimes find that they cannot ‘always do’. 
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20. The studies on which this submission is based, found consistently that the police 
institution always has understood the pragmatic realities of intelligence work and its 
value in preventing and detecting crime, maintaining security and managing risk 
effectively enough to keep communities safe. The credibility of intelligence staffs and 
their endeavours are key factors in the operational reach of intelligence in the police 
organisation but that reach will be limited, and police intelligence practitioners will 
be constrained, as long as intelligence practice lacks the support of those with real 
influence in the wider organisation and that more organisational energy is 
committed to that endeavour.  
 
Recommendations 
In the context of criminal intelligence practice, the police should: 
 cast aside the craft-like trappings of the past;  
 reach out to partners and potential partners in much more inclusive ways;  
 proactively seek out, identify, and adopt best-practice wherever it is found;  
 and above all, recruit the best people (whether detectives or those from any 
other branch of the service – aptitude, ability, and integrity should be 
everything) into the intelligence world and demonstrate an unswerving 
commitment to their continuous professional development.  
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